

## Indonesia's FTF Returnee Framework: Densus 88, RAN PE, and Reintegration Challenges

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### Abstract

This study employs a Qualitative Document Analysis (QDA) method to evaluate Indonesia's repatriation framework. Data were purposively selected from three primary sources: (1) Statutory documents, including Presidential Decree No. 7/2021 (RAN PE) and Law No. 5/2018; (2) Official institutional reports from Densus 88 AT and BNPT regarding FTF management; and (3) Secondary academic literature from 2019–2024 to ensure contemporary relevance. The analysis followed a thematic approach: documents were first coded to identify the operational mandates of Densus 88, then triangulated against the pillars of RAN PE to identify implementation gaps. Finally, findings were derived through deductive reasoning, mapping these legal mandates against the practical challenges of reintegration in the field. The findings indicate that while Densus 88 plays a crucial role in early detection and neutralizing immediate tactical threats, the implementation of RAN PE faces hurdles in inter-agency coordination and the balance between security-centric measures and humanistic reintegration. The research highlights the necessity of a "unity of effort" between Densus 88 and social-sector stakeholders to prevent recidivism. Ultimately, this study concludes that the effectiveness of handling returning FTFs depends on the seamless integration of Densus 88's specialized intelligence into the broader socio-ideological rehabilitation programs mandated by the RAN PE, ensuring that returnees are neutralized ideologically as well as tactically.

**Keywords:** Densus 88, RAN PE, Foreign Terrorist Fighters, Asymmetric Threats, Repatriation, Deradicalization

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### INTRODUCTION

The collapse of the ISIS territorial caliphate in Syria and Iraq has left a complex security residue for the international community, specifically regarding the hundreds of Indonesian citizens who traveled to the region as Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) or their associates. As these individuals seek to return, they introduce a profound asymmetric threat to national security Aslam (2020). Unlike conventional military adversaries, returnees carry "invisible" risks, including advanced combat experience, clandestine international networks, and deeply entrenched radical ideologies that could revitalize local extremist cells.

## Implementing the Multi-Treatment Model through Three-Phase Synchronization

The strategic shift in Indonesia's counter-terrorism policy, codified through Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021 (RAN PE), has fundamentally altered the operational DNA of Densus 88 AT. No longer confined to the role of a tactical "striking force," the unit now serves as a central facilitator in a multi-dimensional security response. This research analyzes this evolution through a Three-Phase Synchronization model that manages the trajectory of Foreign Terrorist Fighter (FTF) returnees from conflict zones back into the Indonesian social fabric.

### *Phase I: Before-Border Strategy – Intelligence Profiling and Preventive Neutralization*

The first phase of the Multi-Treatment model begins long before a returnee reaches Indonesian territory. In this Before-Border stage, Densus 88 AT utilizes "Soft Approach" intelligence to conduct deep profiling in displacement camps such as Al-Hol or Roj. This phase is critical as it moves beyond mere identification toward constructing "Psychological-Social Profiles." By collaborating with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and BNPT, Densus 88 ensures that the verification of citizenship is paired with a preliminary radicalization assessment. This allows the state to differentiate between "hardcore" ideologues and "vulnerable" followers (mostly women and children), ensuring that the subsequent repatriation is not a uniform security action but a tailored intervention strategy.

### *Phase II: At-Border Intervention – Secure Transition and Humanitarian Security*

The transition into the At-Border phase represents a critical "gateway" where national security meets humanitarian obligations. During this phase, the traditional "arrest-first" identity of Densus 88 is replaced by a secure transition mandate. Upon arrival at the port of entry, returnees are triaged based on the profiles established in Phase I. This stage emphasizes "Humanitarian Security," where Densus 88 facilitates the transfer of non-combatants to specialized rehabilitation centers (such as those managed by the Ministry of Social Affairs), while high-risk individuals are managed within the legal framework of Law No. 5 of 2018. This phase provides the necessary legal and psychological "buffer," ensuring that the returnees' first interaction with the state is structured, secure, and conducive to future deradicalization.

### *Phase III: After-Border Transformation – Multi-Treatment Reintegration and Monitoring*

The final and most complex stage is the After-Border phase, which focuses on long-term transformation and social reintegration. This is where the "whole-of-society" pillar of RAN PE is most visible. Densus 88's Regional Task Forces (Satgas Wilayah) shift their focus toward community-based monitoring, working alongside local governments and civil society to mitigate social friction and community rejection. This phase implements the Inter-Dimension Disengagement (IDD) concept, where security is maintained through "Invisible Monitoring." Densus 88 ensures that returnees remain insulated from radical re-recruitment while simultaneously assisting them in accessing the social and economic assistance promised under the RAN PE framework. By integrating structural support with persistent but non-intrusive psychological monitoring, the After-Border phase aims to move the returnee from a state of "security threat" to a state of "community resilience," effectively closing the loop of the Multi-Treatment model.

## Addressing Heterogeneous Risks and Vulnerabilities

A critical rationalization for this study, as argued by O'Hara (2023), is that returnees are not a monolithic group. They represent a spectrum from combatants to traumatized women and children, whose exposure to violence requires specialized rehabilitation. In this context, the state must prevent 'second-stage radicalization', a process where returnees return to extremist networks due to social and economic exclusion. Consequently, this framework utilizes the three Pillars of Reintegration established by Pavlova (2020):"

- Psychosocial Intervention: Addressing war trauma, particularly in women and children.
- Ideological Deconstruction: Utilizing the "Idensos" unit and moderate scholars to foster Islam Wassathiyah (religious moderation).
- Economic Empowerment: Severing the dependency on radical networks through vocational training and capital access.

## **Problem Statement: Bridging the Implementation Gap**

Despite the clear mandate of the RAN PE, a critical tension persists between the "security-first" imperatives of Densus 88 and the "humanistic-reintegration" goals of national policy. Implementation is frequently hindered by information silos, where intensive intelligence profiling data is not fully integrated into community-based case management. This study serves as a rigorous evaluative instrument for SK Kepala BNPT No. 66 of 2025, aiming to optimize policy by synchronizing "At-Border" screening with "After-Border" monitoring. Furthermore, this research addresses a significant gap in existing literature. While previous studies, such as Susilowati et al. (2023), have explored the macro-level diplomatic implications of FTF repatriation, they often overlook the tactical-technical realities on the ground. This study fills that void by providing a granular, operational analysis of Densus 88 AT Polri's role within the domestic "Multi-Treatment" ecosystem, moving beyond high-level theory to explore the specific mechanics of Identification and Socialization, long-term monitoring, and inter-agency data sharing.

## **Research Objectives and Framework**

To address these challenges, the study focuses on three core objectives:

- **Mapping the Threat:** To profile returnees and identify their "invisible" risks. By understanding their diverse motivations (ideological, economic, or familial), the research moves toward high-precision, intelligence-led interventions.
- **Evaluating Effectiveness:** To assess how well current deradicalization and rehabilitation programs work under Law No. 5 of 2018. The study examines if this "Multi-Treatment" approach truly addresses the needs of returnees or if gaps remain that could lead to recidivism.
- **Optimizing Synergy:** To identify and fix "friction points" between agencies like the BNPT, Densus 88, and local governments. This objective seeks to create a seamless coordination model that prevents high-risk individuals from falling through the cracks of national security.

## **Urgency and the "Unity of Effort"**

The necessity of this study is underscored by an evolving legal framework that treats deradicalization as an integral component of "pre-emptive defense." Law No. 5 of 2018 empowers the state to address the roots of radicalization before violence occurs, a mandate further operationalized by Government Regulation No. 77 of 2019. Central to these regulations is the concept of "Unity of Effort." The handling of FTF returnees cannot be performed in isolation; it requires a synchronized, "whole-of-government" response. However, the transition from a security-heavy approach to one that balances intelligence with humanistic reintegration remains a significant hurdle. Without a unified operational standard, the potential for gaps in the "Multi-Treatment" process remains a critical vulnerability.

**Primary Research Objective:** This study aims to evaluate the significance of Densus 88 AT's role within the implementation of the RAN PE. By analyzing the intersection of intelligence operations and national policy, the research identifies the strategic recommendations necessary for a robust national security framework capable of transforming "potential threats" into ideologically resilient and productive citizens.

## **DISCUSSION**

### **The Evolution of Densus 88: From Tactical Striking to Strategic Intelligence**

Densus 88 AT has undergone a significant institutional transformation, shifting from a traditional "striking force" toward a model centered on comprehensive risk profiling and assessment. As noted by Idris and Taufiqurrohman (2021), the unit has moved beyond simple apprehension to become a sophisticated data provider for Indonesia's national deradicalization architecture. In the specific context of Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs), the unit acts as the initial gatekeeper, conducting deep-level profiling that includes:

### *Ideological Mapping*

Assessing the depth of extremist indoctrination to determine the level of threat.

Socio-Psychological Screening: Identifying trauma-related needs, particularly for women and children returning from conflict zones.

- Network Analysis: Tracing domestic links to ensure that reintegration does not inadvertently facilitate the reactivation of local sleeper cells.
- Identification and Mapping: Mapping the specific roles, motivations for departure, and family backgrounds of returnees to ensure subsequent deradicalization programs are tailored to individual needs.
- Risk Data Provision: Providing intelligence-based risk assessments to other agencies, such as the BNPT and the Ministry of Social Affairs, which serves as the foundation for the "multi-treatment" approach
- Decoupling Ideology from Capability: Distinguishing between hardline combatants with high-level tactical skills (ambush, IED assembly) and vulnerable groups like women and children who require different psychosocial interventions.

### *Neutralizing "Sleeping Assets" Through Intelligence*

A critical finding in the research is the identification of "sleeping assets" for the returnees with high-level military capabilities who may appear dormant but remain a latent threat, while the Counter-Asymmetric Strategy: Densus 88 utilizes intelligence-led policing to monitor these individuals' social interactions and digital activities. Preventing Knowledge Transfer: A primary focus of Densus 88's strategic intelligence is preventing these "assets" from transferring their Syrian battlefield expertise (e.g., urban guerrilla tactics) to domestic radical networks like JAD or remnants of ex- JI who refused to disperse.

### *"End-to-End" Lifelong Resilience and Monitoring (From upstream to downstream)*

The evolution of Densus 88 is marked by its commitment to a continuous, "end-to-end" monitoring process from upstream to downstream.

### *Continuous Oversight*

Unlike traditional law enforcement roles that conclude once a verdict is delivered, Densus 88's involvement persists through the suspect, defendant, convict, and inmate stages, extending even after release (former convicts). A Lifelong Commitment: The unit's Regional Task Forces (Satgaswil) utilize "Socialization Identification units to conduct monitoring described as "long-term, potentially lifelong," ensuring that repatriates do not return to radical circles due to social stigma or economic hardship.

### *Integration of "Hard" and "Soft" Power*

This article emphasizes that Densus 88 AT now operates at the critical intersection of security and humanitarianism. According to Istiqomah (2020), through a model of Multi-Treatment Synergy, the unit maintains its "hard approach" capabilities for preemptive strikes under Law No. 5 of 2018 while simultaneously facilitating "soft approach" interventions. This is achieved by engaging a broad spectrum of stakeholders including line ministries, moderate religious figures, deradicalized former convicts (ex-napiter), academics, and NGOs such as YPP to systematically deconstruct radical ideologies (Ramakrishna, 2021). By bridging the gap between national security requirements and the humanitarian needs of returnees, Densus 88 recognizes that successful, long-term reintegration serves as the most effective form of threat neutralization.

### *Evaluating RAN PE Implementation: Synergy and Gaps*

The implementation of the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN PE), as mandated by Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021, represents Indonesia's strategic transition toward a "Whole-of-Government" approach. This policy serves as the essential legal and operational bridge connecting kinetic security measures with long-term social reintegration. Under the RAN PE framework, counter-terrorism is no longer the sole domain of law enforcement; instead, it is built upon Three Pillars: Prevention, Law Enforcement/Protection, and International Cooperation.

This structure necessitates that Densus 88 AT Polri evolves from an isolated tactical unit into a collaborative partner. Their role now requires seamless synchronization with non-security stakeholders, including the National Counter-Terrorism Agency (BNPT), the Ministry of Social Affairs, and provincial governments, to ensure a continuous "rehabilitation pipeline."

#### *The "Coordination Gap" and Information Silos*

Despite this robust policy design, a critical finding of this study is the persistent "Coordination Gap" that threatens the continuity of deradicalization. While Densus 88 demonstrates high operational excellence within the Law Enforcement and Intelligence pillar successfully identifying and neutralizing immediate threats, the handoff to the Social Reintegration phase remains fragmented. A primary obstacle is the lack of a unified data-sharing ecosystem. For example, the intensive psychological and ideological profiling conducted by Densus 88 during initial detention which identifies specific radicalization triggers is often not fully integrated into the case management systems used by local social workers or community leaders. This "information silo" means that those responsible for community-based deradicalization often lack the nuanced intelligence required to tailor their interventions effectively.

#### *Vulnerabilities in Decentralized Monitoring*

Furthermore, this lack of "Unity of Effort" creates a significant vulnerability within the decentralized monitoring system. When returnees are repatriated to their home regions, the monitoring burden shifts to local Task Forces (Satgaswil) and local governments who may lack the specialized expertise or resources of central agencies. Without a seamless flow of intelligence from the "At-Border" phase to the "After-Border" community phase, returnees may encounter a monitoring "blind spot." This gap significantly increases the risk of recidivism; former FTFs, facing social stigma or economic hardship, might slip through these structural cracks and re-establish contact with clandestine extremist networks.

To mitigate this, the research suggests that the RAN PE must move beyond theoretical cooperation. It is imperative to establish a synchronized, real-time reporting mechanism a "National Returnee Dashboard" that ensures the state's watchful eye remains consistent from the point of return to full social recovery. This unified approach is the only way to transform a "potential threat" into a resilient, productive citizen.

#### *Mitigating Asymmetric Threats through Monitoring and Deradicalization*

The significance of Densus 88 in mitigating asymmetric threats is most visible in its sophisticated Post-Release Monitoring capabilities, which serve as a critical defense against the latent risks posed by returning Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs). These individuals often return from conflict zones possessing advanced tactical skills, ranging from urban guerrilla warfare to IED assembly and maintain clandestine international connections capable of revitalizing domestic extremist networks. To counter this, Densus 88 has shifted toward a model of persistent surveillance that blends high-tech intelligence with human-centric "Socialization Identification" (Idensos). This strategy ensures a continuous "watchful eye" on high-risk returnees, preventing them from utilizing their expertise to recruit or train others within local sleeper cells.

#### *Repurposing Assets: The Soft Approach*

A critical finding of this research is the increasing efficacy of Densus 88's "soft approach" initiatives, designed to address the socio-ideological roots of radicalization as mandated by the RAN PE. Central to this strategy is the innovative practice of involving former extremists in counter-narrative programs. Acting as "credible messengers," these individuals are uniquely positioned to deconstruct radical doctrines from within, challenging the "heroic" myths of foreign conflict with the grim reality of their lived experiences. By transforming these "high-risk" individuals into "partners in peace," Densus 88 does more than just neutralize a threat; it actively repurposes human assets to strengthen national ideological resilience.

#### *The "Monitor and Mentor" Model*

Furthermore, this mitigation strategy emphasizes long-term, community-based monitoring to ensure a permanent and stable transition back into society. Densus 88 collaborates with Line Ministries, local governments, deradicalized former convicts (ex-napiter), academics, NGOs, local religious figures, and community leaders to create a supportive environment and prevent recidivism.

By addressing the "push-and-pull" factors of radicalization—such as social isolation or the search for identity, the unit aligns its operational output with the humanistic goals of the National Action Plan. This dual-layered approach of "monitor and mentor" ensures that while the state remains vigilant against kinetic threats, it remains equally committed to the long-term rehabilitation of its citizens, effectively shrinking the operational space for asymmetric threats. When relating these findings to relevant referral sources, Indonesia’s approach through Densus 88 and RAN PE demonstrates a unique "middle-way." Unlike some nations that rely solely on incarceration or others that focus purely on social welfare, Indonesia attempts to fuse tactical security with ideological rehabilitation. The results suggest that the "significance" of Densus 88 is not merely in its ability to arrest, but in its capacity to provide the foundational security data that allows the social components of RAN PE to function safely.

### Comparison with International Standards: The Indonesian "Middle-Way"

This study demonstrates that the synergy between Densus 88 and the RAN PE framework constitutes a unique "middle-way" strategy. Globally, counter-terrorism models often oscillate between two extremes: a strictly securitized model (focusing on incarceration) and a soft-social model (prioritizing welfare). Indonesia’s hybrid paradigm fuses tactical security with ideological rehabilitation, positioning it as a significant global case study Hwang (2018).

The research highlights Densus 88’s evolution into a high-precision data provider. Unlike traditional tactical units that disengage after detention, Densus 88 provides the foundational intelligence—such as combat history and psychological triggers—that allows the social components of the RAN PE to function safely. This ensures that social workers and mentors are not entering high-risk situations "blind." By maintaining a shadow-monitoring role, Densus 88 creates a "security net" that enables humanistic programs to operate in high-threat environments without compromising public safety.

Ultimately, this model aligns with the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy by addressing root causes while maintaining the rule of law. By utilizing the Idensos (Socialization Identification) model, Prasetyo (2024), Densus 88 employs community-centric policing similar to Europe’s "Aarhus Model," but adds a robust intelligence layer tailored to the Southeast Asian landscape. This "middle-way" approach proves that effective counter-terrorism is not a choice between hard and soft power, but rather the seamless synchronization of both to ensure a permanent and monitored transition from the battlefield to society.

### Summary of Findings

To summarize the data processing results, the following table illustrates the role distribution under the RAN PE framework:

**Table 1.** Role Distribution under the RAN PE Framework

Phase of Repatriation	Primary Actor	Densus 88 Role	RAN PE Pillar
Arrival/Entry	BNPT/ MOFA/ Densus 88 / Immigration	Security Screening & Profiling	Law Enforcement
Rehabilitation	BNPT / Kemensos (Social Affairs) / Densus 88	Intelligence Assistance	Prevention
Reintegration	BNPT/ Social Affairs / Densus 88/ Local Gov / Society	Monitoring & Surveillance	Prevention & Partnership

**Source:** Authors’ analysis, December 2025.

The logical interpretation of these findings suggests that while the policy framework (RAN PE) is comprehensive, the success of handling returning FTFs depends heavily on the inter-agency interoperability where Densus 88 acts as the "Intelligence Hub." Without the active involvement of Densus 88 in the

monitoring phase, the social reintegration programs run the risk of being compromised by undetected extremist activities.

### **Concluding Recommendations: Strengthening the National Synergy**

To optimize the handling of FTF returnees and ensure the successful implementation of the RAN PE, this research proposes three strategic recommendations aimed at closing existing operational gaps and maximizing the "Multi-Treatment" synergy

#### *Establishment of a Unified National Intelligence-Social Database*

The most critical recommendation is the creation of a centralized, real-time data-sharing platform that bridges the gap between Densus 88's tactical intelligence and the civilian agencies' social intervention data. This "National Returnee Dashboard" would ensure that every psychological profile, risk assessment, and ideological background captured during the "At-Border" phase is instantly accessible to social workers and local government task forces in the "After-Border" phase. By eliminating information silos, the state can ensure a seamless transition of care and monitoring, ensuring that the intervention strategies are tailored to the specific risk level of the individual.

#### *Institutionalizing the "Idensos" Model at the Regional Level*

Given the decentralized nature of the threat, the research recommends the formal expansion and institutionalization of Densus 88's Socialization Identification (Idensos) unit within all Regional Task Forces (Satgaswil). This unit should act as the permanent liaison between national security apparatuses and local communities. By training local police and community leaders in the "Idensos" method, the state can maintain a persistent but non-intrusive presence in the lives of returnees. This model focuses on early detection of "social friction" or economic hardship, allowing for immediate intervention before these grievances turn into a "pull factor" for re-radicalization.

#### *Development of a Standardized "Exit-Strategy" for Vulnerable Groups*

Finally, the research advocates for a specialized legal and operational framework for women and children who were often non-combatant "associates" in conflict zones. The current "security-first" imperative should be complemented by a standardized "Exit-Strategy" that prioritizes trauma-informed care and rapid social reintegration for these vulnerable clusters. This includes streamlining the process for legal documentation, school enrollment for children, and vocational access for women. By successfully removing the "terrorist" label from children through intensive psychosocial support, the state effectively prevents the emergence of a new generation of extremists, thereby securing long-term national stability.

#### *Analysis of Asymmetric Threats Posed by Returning FTFs*

The repatriation of WNI (Indonesian Citizens) associated with Foreign Terrorist Fighters (FTFs) introduces a non-traditional security challenge that fits the criteria of an asymmetric threat. Unlike conventional adversaries, returnees possess "hybrid" risks. Data processing indicates that these threats are categorized into three dimensions as mentioned in Wibisono et al. (2019)

- Tactical Dimension: Combat experience and mastery of weaponry/explosives gained in Syrian conflict zones.
- Ideological Dimension: The persistence of "Salafi-Jihadist" doctrine which is difficult to measure through physical surveillance alone.
- Network Dimension: Transnational links to global terror cells that can be reactivated within Indonesia.<sup>[1]</sup><sub>SEP</sub> The findings suggest that the asymmetric nature of these returnees requires a security response that is equally fluid, moving beyond static border control to dynamic human intelligence.

*The Strategic Significance of Densus 88 AT in the Security Architecture*

This sub-section discusses the pivotal role of Densus 88 AT as the "gatekeeper" of national security. Based on the evaluation of current operations, Densus 88's significance is demonstrated through two primary functions:

- Intelligence Profiling: Before the implementation of RAN PE programs, Densus 88 conducts a "Security Clearance" and risk-level categorization (High, Medium, Low). This ensures that the rehabilitation approach is tailored to the individual's level of radicalization.
- Preventive Strike vs. Preventive Monitoring: There is a notable transition where Densus 88 now focuses on Preventive Monitoring, maintaining a presence in the community to ensure returnees do not reconnect with local pro-ISIS groups (such as JAD or MIT). This role is essential because while civil institutions (Kemensos/BNPT) handle the "mindset," Densus 88 manages the "physical threat," creating a dual-layered defense system.

*Evaluation of RAN PE Implementation: Challenges in Inter-Agency Synergy*

The implementation of the National Action Plan (RAN PE) is the primary focus of this evaluation. The results show that the Perpres No. 7 Year 2021 has successfully provided a legal umbrella for "soft approach" measures. However, the discussion identifies several implementation gaps:

- Information Silos: There is often a disconnect between the intelligence gathered by Densus 88 and the reintegration programs managed by local governments.
- Standardization of Deradicalization: While RAN PE mandates deradicalization, the "success indicators" for a "de-radicalized" FTF are still subjective, leading to variations in how Densus 88 and BNPT view a returnee's progress.
- Community Readiness: Data suggests that the RAN PE pillar regarding "Partnership" is the most challenging to implement. The presence of Densus 88 in the monitoring phase can sometimes trigger social stigma, which contradicts the "reintegration" goals of the RAN PE.

*Synthesis of Security and Reintegration*

Relating these findings, the synergy between Densus 88 and RAN PE represents a modern application of national resilience. The discussion concludes that Densus 88 provides the Stability (Security) necessary for the RAN PE to achieve Sustainability (Social Reintegration). Without the security baseline provided by Densus 88, social programs would be vulnerable to exploitation by sleeper cells.

**Table 2.** Comparison of Densus 88 Roles (Pre-RAN PE vs. Post-RAN PE)

Aspect	Pre-RAN PE (Before 2021)	Post-RAN PE (Implementation)
Primary Goal	Neutralization & Arrest	Profiling, Monitoring & Deradicalization
Method	Hard Approach (Tactical)	Balanced Approach (Intelligence + Soft)
Agency Interaction	Minimal/Internal	Collaborative (Cross-Ministry)
Focus on FTF	Criminal Prosecution	Risk Management & Reintegration Support

**Source:** Authors' analysis, December 2025.

**CONCLUSION**

**Summary of Findings: The Evolution of a Strategic Hub**

This research concludes that Special Detachment 88 Anti-Terror (Densus 88 AT) plays a transformative role in the implementation of the National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (RAN

PE). Its significance has evolved from a traditional kinetic "striking force" into a strategic "open intelligence hub" that underpins the entire repatriation process. By conducting rigorous profiling and risk assessments, Densus 88 provides the essential security baseline that allows "soft approach" measures such as rehabilitation and reintegration—to be applied safely and effectively.

### **Policy Evaluation: Addressing the Handover Gap**

The evaluation of the RAN PE framework reveals that while it provides a robust legal and humanistic structure, its success is heavily contingent on inter-agency interoperability. Densus 88 acts as the primary mitigator of asymmetric threats, such as combat-hardened skills and transnational extremist networks. However, a significant challenge remains in the "handover" process between security-centric monitoring and community-based reintegration. A lack of synchronized data between Densus 88 and local stakeholders creates security "blind spots" that potentially increase the risk of recidivism.

### **Concluding Recommendations: Strengthening National Synergy**

To optimize the handling of FTF returnees and ensure a "Unity of Effort," this study proposes three strategic pillars:

- Establishment of a Unified National Intelligence-Social Database: The creation of a centralized, real-time "National Returnee Dashboard" is critical. This platform would bridge the gap between tactical intelligence and civilian social intervention, ensuring that psychological profiles and risk assessments captured during the "At-Border" phase are instantly accessible to social workers and local task forces in the "After-Border" phase.
- Institutionalizing the "Idensos" Model at the Regional Level: The research recommends the formal expansion of Densus 88's Social Identification (Idensos) unit within all Regional Task Forces (Satgaswil). By training local police and community leaders in this method, the state can maintain a persistent, non-intrusive presence that focuses on early detection of social friction before it turns into a "pull factor" for re-radicalization.
- Standardized "Exit-Strategy" for Vulnerable Groups: A specialized framework is required for women and children who were often non-combatant associates. This strategy should prioritize trauma-informed care and rapid social reintegration—including school enrollment and vocational access—to remove the "terrorist" label and secure long-term stability.

### **SUGGESTION**

For Policy Makers (Government and BNPT): Refine the technical guidelines of Presidential Decree No. 7 of 2021 to explicitly define transition protocols. A standardized Individual Treatment Plan (ITP) should be developed to allow secure profiling data access for social workers.

- For Densus 88 AT Polri: Further institutionalize "Soft Approach" units with specialized training in community-based psychological intervention, allowing officers to act as mentors without triggering social stigma.
- For Local Governments: Develop Regional Action Plans (RAD PE) that increase "reception readiness" and involve local religious leaders in the monitoring process to strengthen the socio-economic resilience of returnees.

The countering of asymmetric threats cannot be achieved through security or social measures in isolation. The synergy between Densus 88's specialized capabilities and the RAN PE's humanistic objectives represents the cornerstone of Indonesia's resilience against violent extremism.

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